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final end look like? What would the Afro-relational approach prescribe for sentencing? 
Would its implications for this matter forcefully rival the kinds of penalties that judges 
in South Africa and similar jurisdictions typically mete out? After pointing out how the 
southern African ethic of ubuntu is well understood as a relational ethic, I draw out of it a 
conception of reconciliation that I advance as a strong candidate for being the proper final 
end of a criminal trial  I argue that, far from requiring forgiveness, seeking reconciliation 
can provide strong reason to punish offenders  Specifically, a reconciliatory sentence is 
one that roughly has offenders reform their characters and compensate their victims in 
ways the offenders find burdensome, thereby disavowing the crime and tending to foster 
cooperation and mutual aid  I argue that this novel account of punishment is a prima 
facie attractive alternative to more familiar retributive and deterrence rationales, and 
that it entails that widespread practices such as imprisonment and mandatory minimum 
sentences are unjust 
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I INTRODUCTION
It might seem obvious what the point of a criminal trial is: to ascertain whether there is legal 
guilt and to impose a penalty in response to it  However, from a philosophical perspective, 
it is fair to ask why judges should impose a penalty in response to a crime, not to mention 
which penalties are appropriate  It is not enough to respond that judges should impose certain 
penalties because the common law or a legislative or constitutional provision instructs them 
to, for that begs the question of why there should be law requiring judges to respond to crimes 
in those ways  
Salient accounts of what judges should ultimately be trying to achieve when responding to 
crime in contemporary English-speaking jurisprudence include protecting rights, giving people 
what they deserve and other views that are Western and individualist (in senses spelled out 
below)  These conceptions of the proper final end of a trial have important ramifications for 
which penalties, if any, a judge ought to impose 
In this article, I seek to answer the following cluster of questions: What would a 
characteristically African, and specifically relational, conception of a criminal trial’s final 
end look like? What would the Afro-relational approach prescribe for sentencing? Would 
its implications forcefully rival the kinds of penalties that judges in South Africa and similar 
jurisdictions typically mete out? 
In what follows I answer these questions about respects in which a judge should sentence 
offenders in the light of ubuntu, the Nguni term meaning humanness that is widely used in 
South Africa and more broadly on the continent to capture indigenous sub-Saharan ideas about 
morality  After pointing out how ubuntu is well understood as a relational ethic, I draw out 
of it a certain conception of reconciliation that I advance as a strong candidate for being the 
proper final end of a criminal trial and as having prima facie attractive implications for how to 
punish offenders  Although a reconciliatory approach to sentencing is from (South) Africa, it 
is not meant to be only for (South) Africa; those working in other traditions should be able to 
find something of prima facie interest in it  
Of course, others are known for having argued that ubuntu and related traditional African 
values prescribe reconciliation, social cohesion or restorative justice 1 However, when such an 
approach has been applied to contemporary, large-scale societies, it has usually been viewed 
as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, that is, as something to be sought only in 
the cases of adolescents,2 or less serious offences,3 or transitional societies,4 or customary law 
matters 5 In contrast, I am interested in how ubuntu might ground a mainstream approach to 
the way judges in ‘modern’ societies punitively respond to violations of criminal law, which 
has yet to be considered  
1 J Murungi ‘The Question of an African Jurisprudence’ in K Wiredu (ed) A Companion to African Philosophy 
(2004) 522–523; W Idowu ‘African Jurisprudence and the Reconciliation Theory of Law’ (2006) 37 Cambrian 
Law Review 1; D Louw ‘The African Concept of Ubuntu and Restorative Justice’ in D Sullivan and L Tifft 
(eds) Handbook of Restorative Justice (2006) 161; and A Krog ‘This Thing Called Reconciliation: Forgiveness 
as Part of an Interconnectedness-towards-Wholeness’ (2008) 27 South African Journal of Philosophy 353 
2 Dikoko v Mokhatla [2006] ZACC 10 at para 115 (Sachs J points out disapprovingly)  (Dikoko)
3 South African Law Commission Sentencing: A New Sentencing Framework (2000) xviii 
4 D Tutu No Future without Forgiveness (1999) 
5 F Mnyongani ‘Duties of a Lawyer in a Multicultural Society: A Customary Law Perspective?’ (2012) 23 
Stellenbosch Law Review 352 
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In addition, others have contended that reconciliation essentially requires forgiveness of 
offenders or otherwise demands a non-punitive response to them if at all possible 6 However, 
I argue that an ubuntu-based conception of reconciliation between disputants as the point of a 
criminal trial grounds a novel account of when and how judges should punish offenders, one 
that is a real competitor to dominant approaches to sentencing  In a nutshell, instead of seeking 
to give offenders what they deserve or to instil fear in prospective offenders so as to prevent 
rights violations, reconciliation would have offenders reform their characters and compensate 
their victims in ways the offenders find burdensome, thereby disavowing the crime while 
tending to foster cooperation and mutual aid 
In order to illustrate the differences between these approaches to punishment, I address the 
recent South African Constitutional Court case of Ndlovu v The State 7 The case was about 
precisely which mandatory minimum prison sentence to impose on Brendan Solly Ndlovu, 
who was morally guilty of having both committed rape and inflicted serious bodily harm, but 
had been charged with only the former  Ndlovu naturally preferred a lighter sentence than what 
the state sought  I, however, provide reason to doubt both sides of the dispute, maintaining 
that no mandatory minimum prison sentence would have been ideal, even given Ndlovu’s 
serious crimes  Although mandatory minimums could make sense by appeal to retribution or 
deterrence, I argue that they are largely out of place in a reconciliatory scheme, by which judges 
would routinely need to attend to the specifics of the offender, his victim and the broader 
social context  Furthermore, I contend that while punishing with imprisonment could well be 
prescribed by considerations of retribution or deterrence, doing so is normally proscribed by 
a reconciliatory perspective  
In the next section of this article, I begin by reminding readers of the most influential 
conceptions of the point of a criminal trial, noting how it entails certain conceptions of 
just punishment, and indicating why these conceptions count as Western and individualist 
(section II)  Then, I sketch a moral-philosophical interpretation of the African ethic of ubuntu 
and draw from it a certain conception of reconciliation (section III)  In the next section, I 
suppose that the point of a criminal trial is to bring about such reconciliation and spell out 
what this would mean for how to punish (section IV)  Along the way, I contrast reconciliatory 
sentencing with the more Western/individualist theories of punishment as well as indicate 
how reconciliatory sentencing prescribes changes to some current practices that these theories 
support using Ndlovu as a foil  I conclude by noting some further research that it would make 
sense to undertake  This includes how to obtain evidence of guilt in a criminal trial and what 
to criminalise in the first place, supposing this article has advanced a plausible, Afro-centric 
and reconciliatory alternative to dominant models of criminal justice (section V)  
II DOMINANT PHILOSOPHIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In this section I briefly recount the philosophies of criminal justice that have been particularly 
prominent in English-speaking jurisprudence and have influenced practice in South Africa 
and similar jurisdictions in both Africa and the West the most  I also explain why I label 
6 J de Gruchy Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (2002) 170, 178–179; Krog (note 1 above); D Tutu ‘Foreword’ 
in C Villa-Vicencio (ed) Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation in Africa (2009) ix; F de Klerk ‘The 
Need for Forgiveness and Reconciliation’ in F du Toit & E Doxtader (eds) In the Balance: South Africans Debate 
Reconciliation (2010) 27 
7 Ndlovu v The State [2017] ZACC 19, 2017 (10) BCLR 1286 (CC)(Ndlovu) 
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them ‘Western’ and ‘individualist’, in contrast to the more ‘African’ and ‘relational’ approach 
articulated in the following section  
By ‘criminal justice’ I mean the contested issue of how the political community should 
respond morally to legal transgressions, where one potential response is the infliction of 
punishment  State punishment, in turn, is essentially a matter of trying to burden or deprive 
someone in response to a legal transgression that has been committed (or represented as such) 8 
So defined, a criminal justice system that includes state punishment differs from civil justice, 
defensive force and quarantine, which do not necessarily include aiming to burden someone 
because of a legal transgression 
Retributivism, or the ‘pay back’ theory, is one influential account of why there should 
be a criminal trial and of how state punishment should be inflicted to achieve its final end  
I use the term ‘retributivism’ broadly to signify the view that the aim of a trial should be to 
determine whether someone is guilty of having broken a just law and to impose a penalty that 
is proportionate to the crime he committed in the past  In the South African context, this 
approach is often alluded to with the suggestion that sentencing ought to fit ‘the nature of the 
crime’ or ‘the seriousness of the offence’ and that there is a presumption against ‘disturbing 
disparities’ or a ‘striking difference’ between two sentences for the same crime  Someone guilty 
of rape, such as Ndlovu, should invariably receive a harsh penalty, much harsher than someone 
guilty of stealing a candy bar, and just because of what they have respectively done 
Within the genus of retributivism, philosophers of law have articulated various species  
For instance, there is desert theory, the view that the aim of a criminal trial should be to 
give offenders what they deserve for having culpably done wrong 9 Just as one can positively 
deserve a job, a raise or a reward of a sort that is proportionate to having done well, so one can 
negatively deserve a penalty that is fitting in respect of having acted poorly  
Another instance of retributivism is fairness theory, the view that the point of a criminal 
trial is to ascertain which, if any, crime occurred and to impose a penalty that will remove the 
unfair advantage the criminal thereby took of other law-abiding residents 10 In order for there 
to be rule of law, everyone must restrict their liberty by obeying it, such that when someone 
breaks the law, she is getting the benefit of the rule of law without undergoing the burden 
needed to produce it  Punishment is thought to remove the unfairness by imposing a burden 
similar in degree to that which the offender failed to carry  
Retributivism is a ‘backward-looking’ view,11 directing a judge to consider the past in 
order to ascertain what to do in the present  When imposing a sentence, a judge has to 
consider whether a defendant is guilty of a crime and, if so, how grave a crime it was, 
and from that determine which penalty is proportionate to the severity of the crime  The 
only consideration about the future a retributivist might routinely consider is whether by 
imposing a penalty on an offender the court would foreseeably bring undeserved harm to 
8 H Bedau & E Kelly ‘Punishment’ in E Zalta (ed) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015) section 2, available 
at https://plato stanford edu/entries/punishment 
9 A von Hirsch Past or Future Crimes (1987); M Moore Placing Blame (1997); and S Kershnar ‘A Defense of 
Retributivism’ (2000) 14 International Journal of Applied Philosophy 97 
10 J Murphy Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (1979); M Davis To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime (1992); and 
R Dagger ‘Playing Fair with Punishment’ (1993) 103 Ethics 473 
11 The distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking theories of punishment comes from T Metz 
‘Censure Theory and Intuitions about Punishment’ (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 491 and ‘Legal Punishment’ 
in D Moellendorf & C Roederer (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 555 
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some other innocent parties such as his children  Otherwise, a retributivist does not believe 
that the point of a sentence is to prevent either the offender or others in society from 
committing crime down the road  
In contrast, the other familiar class of accounts of criminal justice are resolutely ‘forward-
looking’, requiring the prevention of crime or similarly desirable outcomes in order for state 
punishment to be justified  Utilitarianism is one instance of this general category  According 
to this approach, the time, labour and other costs of a criminal trial are justified insofar 
as it would do some long-term good for society  In particular, a trial ought to put a judge 
in a position to ascertain whether imposing a penalty would reduce other, greater harms 
(bads) such as crimes, or produce compensating benefits (goods), for people more than any 
non-punitive response 12 
However, utilitarianism is not the only forward-looking view, with many of those who 
believe in fundamental rights also maintaining that punishment must have some desirable 
effect in order to be just  Consider, for instance, the idea that by having committed a crime, 
a criminal forfeits his right not to be punished, and that he may justly be punished if and 
only if doing so would protect society from similar crimes in the future 13 By this approach, 
punishment is justified in more or less the way force used in self- and other defence is, with the 
point of a trial being to ascertain whether someone has aggressed against others and thereby 
forfeited his rights and, if so, whether a penalty of some kind (no greater than the rights 
forfeited) would prevent future aggression either by him or others  
For both utilitarian and defensive force approaches, incapacitation and deterrence are 
central (even if not exhaustive) mechanisms by which punishment is thought to be desirable for 
controlling crime  Adherents to these influential forward-looking views welcome the prospect 
of potential (re-)offenders either being rendered unable to break the law or being afraid of what 
would happen if they exercised their ability to do so  Putting the likes of a rapist in prison for 
a long time could well serve both functions 
Although these are not the only accounts of why a punishment system should be established 
and maintained, they have been the most influential ones over the past two hundred or so 
years in English-speaking philosophy  They have grown out of the moral-philosophical soil 
that has been prominent in the West, including the duty-based principle of respect for persons 
articulated by Immanuel Kant; the natural rights ethic often ascribed to John Locke; and the 
utilitarian morality of Jeremy Bentham  It is in this sense that I call these theories of criminal 
justice ‘Western’; they have been salient in the philosophical thought, and also juristic practice, 
of North America, the United Kingdom and Europe  These accounts have been prominent in 
12 J Smart ‘Utilitarianism and Punishment’ (1991) 25 Israel Law Review 360; R Brandt ‘A Utilitarian Theory of 
Punishment’ in J Sterba (ed) Morality in Practice (5th Ed, 1997) 512; and J Braithwaite and P Pettit Not Just 
Deserts (1990) 
13 D Farrell ‘The Justification of Deterrent Violence’ (1990) 100 Ethics 301; J Murphy ‘Retributivism, Moral 
Education, and the Liberal State’ and ‘Why Have Criminal Law at All?’ in J Murphy Retribution Reconsidered 
(1992); and P Montague Punishment as Societal-Defense (1995) 
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many Western cultures for a long time in ways they have not in others, such as the East Asian, 
Indian, Middle Eastern and African 14
Despite the important distinction between the backward- and forward-looking rationales for 
a criminal trial that have been prominent in the West, both share a common feature, namely, 
individualism  The accounts sketched above are all grounded on the idea that what gives people 
a moral status are features internal to them  For the Kantian it is our capacity to reason; for 
the Lockean it is that we own ourselves and what we work on; and for the Benthamite it is 
that we can feel pleasure or otherwise be satisfied  Crimes are typically viewed as degrading 
to an individual’s ability to make a choice for herself, or as violating her rights to control her 
mind, body and what she has put herself into, or as causing unnecessary pain, with penalties 
being justified as ways of respecting an individual’s choice, protecting individual rights to life, 
liberty and property, or preventing pain from coming to individuals (even if treated as a sum)  
In the next section, I spell out an ethic that, in contrast, is characteristic of African cultures 
and is relational  From this perspective, what gives people dignity is roughly that they could 
interact cohesively, which grounds an approach to criminal justice according to which its aim 
should be to fix broken relationships, often by employing punishment  
III UBUNTU AS A RELATIONAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY15
According to one large swathe of southern, and more generally sub-Saharan, African thought 
about morality, one’s basic goal in life should be to become a real person or develop human 
excellence, that is, to exhibit ubuntu, with the central (if not sole) way to do so being roughly 
to commune or harmonise with others  After spelling out one plausible interpretation of what 
communion or harmony involves, I suggest that reconciliation is well understood as partial 
communion, a stepping-stone towards a fuller sort that would be ideal 
A An Afro-communal ethic
As Desmond Tutu, the influential South African Nobel Peace Prize winner and Chairperson 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has remarked of characteristically African 
approaches to morality – 
[w]e say, ‘a person is a person through other people’  It is not ‘I think therefore I am’  It says rather: 
‘I am human because I belong ’ I participate, I share … Harmony, friendliness, community are 
great goods  Social harmony is for us the summum bonum – the greatest good 16 
14 In using the geographical label ‘Western’ in this way, I am not implying that considerations of desert, fairness, 
utility and defensive force have decidedly influenced thought about criminal justice either everywhere in 
that location or only in it  Of course there have been some Western philosophers who have rejected all these 
accounts, and there have been some non-Western ones who have accepted some of them  The label is meant to 
designate what has been particularly recurrent (not universal) in much of a locale for a long while, relative to 
many (not all) other spaces and times  Hence, it is quite possible that a person who lives in Africa in the twenty-
first century might not hold values that are below described as ‘African’  That is, they may not subscribe to an 
ethos that possessed moral salience over much of the continent for several hundred years  For some defence of 
this way of using geographical labels, see T Metz ‘How the West Was One: The Western as Individualist, the 
African as Communitarian’ (2015) 47 Educational Philosophy and Theory 1175 
15 This section relies on ideas previously articulated in T Metz ‘South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in the Light of Ubuntu’ in M Swart & K van Marle (eds) The Limits of Transition: The South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 20 Years on (2017) 221 
16 Tutu (note 4 above) 35  
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As for what a harmonious or communal relationship involves in some more detail, consider 
the following statements from a variety of additional South African thinkers  
Former South African Constitutional Court Justice Yvonne Mokgoro remarks in an essay 
on ubuntu and the law, ‘Harmony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations 
within the group – thus the notion umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu/motho ke motho ka batho 
ba bangwe (a person is a person through other persons—ed )’ 17 Gessler Muxe Nkondo, 
who has had positions of leadership on South Africa’s National Heritage Council, says that 
‘ubuntu advocates … express commitment to the good of the community in which their 
identities were formed, and a need to experience their lives as bound up in that of their 
community’ 18 Nhlanhla Mkhize, an academic psychologist and Dean at the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, remarks that ‘personhood is defined in relation to the community … A sense 
of community exists if people are mutually responsive to one another’s needs … [O]ne attains 
the complements associated with full or mature selfhood through participation in a community 
of similarly constituted selves … To be is to belong and to participate’ 19 For a final example, 
two South African theologians, Mluleki Mnyaka and Mokgethi Motlhabi, understand ubuntu 
as follows: 
Individuals consider themselves integral parts of the whole community  A person is socialised 
to think of himself, or herself, as inextricably bound to others … Ubuntu ethics can be termed 
anti-egoistic as it (sic) discourages people from seeking their own good without regard for, or to 
the detriment of, others and the community 20
This characterization of ubuntu and other construals of communing or living harmoniously 
with others embrace two recurrent themes 21 On the one hand, part of so relating is what I 
call ‘identifying with others’ or ‘sharing a way of life’, a matter of participating, being close, 
experiencing life as bound up with others, belonging and considering oneself a part of the 
whole  On the other hand, one finds references to sharing, being sympathetic, being committed 
to others, responding to others’ needs and acting for others’ good, which I call ‘exhibiting 
solidarity’ or ‘caring’ 
More carefully, it is revealing to understand identifying with another (or being close, 
belonging, etc) to be the combination of exhibiting certain psychological attitudes of we-ness 
and cooperative behaviour  The psychological attitudes include a tendency to think of oneself 
as a member of a group with the other and to refer to oneself as a ‘we’ (rather than an ‘I’), 
a disposition to feel pride or shame in what the other or one’s group does, and, at a higher 
level of intensity, an emotional appreciation of the other’s nature and value  The cooperative 
behaviours include being transparent about the terms of interaction, allowing others to make 
voluntary choices, acting on the basis of trust, engaging in joint projects, and, at the extreme 
end, choosing for the reason that ‘this is who we are’ 
The other part of communing or harmonising, namely, exhibiting solidarity with another 
(or acting for others’ good, etc), is also usefully construed as the combination of exhibiting 
17 Y Mokgoro ‘Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa’ (1998) 1 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 17  
18 G Nkondo ‘Ubuntu as a Public Policy in South Africa’ (2007) 2 International Journal of African Renaissance 
Studies 91 
19 N Mkhize ‘Ubuntu and Harmony’ in R Nicolson (ed) Persons in Community: African Ethics in a Global Culture 
(2008) 39, 40  
20 M Mnyaka & M Mokgethi ‘Ubuntu and Its Socio-moral Significance’ in M Murove (ed) African Ethics: An 
Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics (2009) 69  
21 T Metz ‘Toward an African Moral Theory’ (2007) 15 Journal of Political Philosophy 321 
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certain psychological attitudes and engaging in certain kinds of behaviour  Here, the attitudes 
are ones positively oriented towards the other’s quality of life, and they include a belief that 
the other merits aid for her own sake, an empathetic awareness of the other’s condition, and 
a sympathetic emotional reaction to this awareness  The actions are not merely those likely to 
be beneficial, that is, to make the other better off in welfarist terms, but also, in the ideal case, 
are ones done for that reason and for the sake of making the other a better person or for the 
sake of communal relationship itself 
Communal 
relationship
Identity 
(share way of life)
Solidarity 
(care for quality 
of life)
Sense of 
togetherness
Cooperative 
participation Aid
Sympathetic 
altruism
 Figure 1: Schematic representation of communion
In sum, what I take to be the attractive moral core of ubuntu is the proposition that one 
ought to develop human excellence, which one can do by sharing a way of life with others and 
caring for them, or, more carefully, by treating people as having a dignity in virtue of their 
capacity to be party to these communal or harmonious relationships  This analysis of ubuntu 
is a moral-philosophical reconstruction, a secular one that does not rely on highly contested 
metaphysical claims about the existence of imperceptible agents such as ancestors and forces 
such as witchcraft, and one that should be prima facie appealing to readers from a wide array 
of cultures  
By this approach to ethics, any given agent should, roughly, seek to create, maintain and 
enrich relationships of sharing and caring  Conversely, one would act wrongly if one either 
failed to do so (at least with other innocent parties), or, worse, prized the opposite, anti-social 
relationships  On the face of it, actions that intuitively count as crimes are ones in which 
people act out of an ‘us versus them’ attitude, subordinate others, harm them and do so out 
of indifference to their good or even cruelty  In terms of ubuntu, it is relating discordantly in 
these ways that calls for a reconciliatory response  
One can see how an interest in reconciliation consequent to crime would follow from an 
ethic of treating people with respect insofar as they are capable of identity and solidarity  If 
what is of utmost importance is relating communally or harmoniously, then one who acts in 
a discordant manner should be treated in ways that are likely to counteract his discordance 
and to foster harmony between him and others  The focus on rebuilding relationships differs 
from an individualist focus on, say, giving people what they deserve or preventing pain from 
coming to them, with further contrasts drawn below 
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B Reconciliation as a function of communion22
In this section, I appeal to elements of the African ideal of communion to articulate the 
essentials of a desirable kind of reconciliation  It is only in the following section that I draw 
from it a certain punitive approach to responding to violations of criminal law  
In general, reconciliation is something that occurs after a period of conflict, ranging from 
a fight between spouses to systematic human rights violations between groups  In addition, 
while reconciliation is probably good for its own sake to some degree, few think of it as an ideal, 
with reconciliation instead usually being understood as something that lays a path towards an 
ideal  At a social level, reconciliation is not necessarily full-blown distributive justice, and at 
the interpersonal level it is not essentially real love 23 
There are a variety of ways of conceiving of a desirable, but less than ideal, form of social 
interaction consequent to conflict  The one I propose is grounded on the ubuntu ethic sketched 
above  Suppose, with ubuntu, that a state’s moral duty (or that of its officials, if one is sceptical 
that a state as such is a collective agent that has moral duties) is to treat residents as special 
in virtue of their capacity for communal/harmonious relationships  One clear way of doing 
so would be for a state to foster such relationships between people in its territory, that is, 
to actualise the special capacity  Now, if one proper final end of the state were to engender 
communal relationships, and if reconciliation were a stepping stone towards such a condition, 
then it would be sensible to think of reconciliation as constituted by some of the elements of 
communion 
Specifically, a promising conception of reconciliation is based mainly on what I labelled 
the behavioural facets of a characteristically African conception of communion/harmony, 
and not as much on the attitudinal ones  As a first approximation, consider the view that 
to reconcile is for two parties to engage in cooperative behaviour oriented towards mutual 
aid  Such need not involve mental states such as thinking of oneself as a ‘we’, taking pride in 
others’ accomplishments, exhibiting sympathy towards others or acting for their sake 24 Of 
course, people’s hearts and minds would need to change to some degree in order to move from 
serious discord, roughly substantial subordination and harm, to a way of relating with the 
core, behavioural components of identity and solidarity as above  However, they would need 
to do so to a much lesser degree than they would in order, say, to be motivated by altruism or 
compassion, or to enjoy a sense of togetherness  Supposing, then, that communion is central 
to ethics and that reconciliation contributes towards full-blown communion, it is plausible to 
22 This subsection draws on two prior works: T Metz ‘Limiting the Reach of Amnesty for Political Crimes: Which 
Extra-Legal Burdens on the Guilty Does National Reconciliation Permit?’ (2011) 3 Constitutional Court Review 
243; T Metz ‘A Theory of National Reconciliation’ in C Corradetti, N Eisikovits & J Rotondi (eds) Theorizing 
Transitional Justice (2015) 119 
23 Metz ‘A Theory of National Reconciliation’ (note 22 above) 120–121 
24 Were we to require inclusion of these psychological responses, we would be expecting ‘too much’ from the 
concept of reconciliation, and demanding that it conform too closely to a specific and rather demanding 
social ideal  After a period of serious conflict between people, one cannot expect their beliefs and emotions 
to change quickly, whereas their behaviour might  Consider that although after World War II many West 
Germans reportedly continued to favour Hitler’s policies, they nonetheless conformed to a constitutional 
order that sought to repair some of the damage done to the Jewish and other oppressed populations  Whatever 
(desirable) changes to the collective mindset that (ostensibly) occurred, they came much later  What goes for 
two populations might plausibly be said to hold for two people  
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think of reconciliation as consisting mainly of the behavioural facets of it, and not requiring 
all the emotional and motivational ones 
Note that, unlike some conceptions of reconciliation offered by South African thinkers, 
particularly those in the Christian tradition,25 forgiveness, understood as including the 
dissipation of negative emotions, is not essential to the conception I propose  Neither is 
empathy,26 nor is ‘a spiritual sense of belonging and community that draws people towards a 
fullness of humanity through others’ 27 Forgiveness, empathy and a spiritual sense of belonging 
would be elements of a complete communion (or perhaps the very best form of reconciliation), 
but are too demanding for reconciliation as such, which is less than ideal  
One way to honour the final value of people’s capacity for communion is to realise it 
as an end, that is, to actualise communal relationships; however, that is not the only way 
to express certain positive attitudes towards this special capacity  Specifically, an attractive 
notion of reconciliation, as a way of respecting people’s capacity to commune, is one that also 
includes the disavowal of disrespectful treatments of this superlative value that were undertaken 
in the past  That would involve those associated with victims, such as family members and 
wrongdoers, as well as the political community in certain kinds of cases, expressing disapproval 
of the wrongdoing (ie, roughly the prizing of discord) that took place  
Sometimes people who have been party to a conflict that includes wrongdoing are able to 
come together and repair the relationship without thinking in those terms, perhaps electing to 
forget without any moral reflection on what transpired  However, my suggestion is that usually 
such so-called ‘reconciliation’ is not particularly desirable  To honour the value of communion 
means acknowledging when it has been seriously undermined in impermissible ways (when it 
comes to victims); and to treat people as special by virtue of their capacity to commune also 
means responding to offenders in the light of the way they have misused this capacity  In the 
best case scenario, this would involve offenders hearing victims out, apologising to them and 
expressing remorse by striving both to make up for wrongful harm done and to avoid repeating 
the wrong  However, at least where offenders are unwilling to do these things, a political 
community that has taken responsibility for upholding residents’ dignity should hear victims 
out, acknowledge aspects in which they were mistreated, express disapproval of how they were 
mistreated and do so by effecting reparations for wrongful harm they suffered and making it 
clear that it will protect them from further mistreatment  
Putting things together, here is an ubuntu-based account of an attractive conception 
of reconciliation: a condition consequent to interpersonal conflict in which those directly 
affected by it interact on a largely voluntary, transparent and trustworthy basis for the sake of 
compossible ends largely oriented towards doing what is expected to be good for one another 
and in which those associated with victims disavow wrongdoing that was part of the conflict 
Notice the two basic parts here: the realisation of (behavioural) harmony and the disavowal 
of prior discord  Mere disavowal of a wrong would not be sufficient for something to count 
as reconciliation at all, while mere (behavioural) harmony consequent to a wrong would be 
sufficient for reconciliation, but not a particularly welcome form of it  If, by ubuntu, we must 
25  Several authors cited near the beginning of this article (note 6 above) offer good examples of this mindset  
26  Cf P Lenta ‘In Defence of AZAPO and Restorative Justice’ in W le Roux & K van Marle (eds) Law, Memory 
and the Legacy of Apartheid (2007) 162, 172  
27 C Villa-Vicencio ‘Reconciliation: A Thing that Won’t Go Away’ in F du Toit & E Doxtader (eds) In the Balance: 
South Africans Debate Reconciliation (2010) 165 
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treat people as special by virtue of their capacity for harmonious relationships, then both facets 
are plausibly essential for a desirable kind of reconciliation  
IV RECONCILIATORY SENTENCING
In this section, I spell out what it would mean for a criminal trial to seek out reconciliation as 
an end, focusing in particular on the implications of reconciliation for laying down penalties  
I contrast reconciliatory prescriptions for sentencing both with Western-individualist theories 
of punishment and with some predominant ways that people are punished in South Africa and 
similar jurisdictions, including imprisonment and mandatory minimum sentences  Although 
I do not aim to convince the reader that a reconciliatory approach to sentencing is justified, I 
do try to show that it should not be dismissed as a rival to more familiar models and practices 
A Reconciliation as fact-finding
If reconciliation between at least offenders and victims28 were a central point of a criminal trial, 
then an important task for a judge would be to obtain the truth about what had transpired  
For one, the notion of reconciliation from the previous section requires disavowing wrongful 
discord, which, in turn, means that there is a clear fact-finding role for a court: it must discover 
who acted wrongfully and in what respects  A court must sort between the innocent and the 
guilty, and ascertain how much guilt there is and for what, so as to be in a position to express 
disapproval of wrongdoing  
Furthermore, even the advancement of behavioural communion, in the form of cooperation, 
prescribes truth about the past  Two parties genuinely share a way of life when they are clear 
about how they have interacted in serious ways that potentially include wrongdoing, or at least 
when they are aware of what the other thinks about that  And those associated with these two 
parties, such as family members and co-workers, also need the truth about the past in order to 
share a way of life with them, as opposed to being isolated by virtue of ignorance  
It is an empirical question of whether an adversarial system or an inquisitorial one (or a mix, 
or something else) would do a satisfactory job of revealing the truth about past wrongdoing  
Legal scholars who draw on traditional African culture have invariably eschewed adversarialism, 
since its competitive or combative nature appears incompatible with duties to do what is 
best for society29 or to foster reconciliation amongst disputants 30 However, if reconciliation 
includes moving forward together in the light of an accurate awareness of what transpired in 
the past, and if it happened to be the case that an adversarial system is necessary to facilitate that 
adequately or did so to a much greater degree, then there would be a strong, under-appreciated 
case for adversarialism on grounds of reconciliation  Any plausible African ethic will make space 
for competitive fora such as sports and markets (which does not necessarily mean capitalism) 
roughly because they can facilitate a greater harmony on balance for society, and it could be 
that a competitive courtroom is analogously justified 31 
28 In the conclusion I raise the issue of whether reconciliation should be sought amongst more than just victims 
and offenders  
29 J Murungi An Introduction to African Legal Philosophy (2013) 124–126, 149 
30 Idowu (note 1 above) 13, 15 
31 In any event, how to obtain evidence of guilt is an issue to address in detail elsewhere  The focus of this article 
is how to punish persons once one has obtained evidence of their guilt 
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B Reconciliation as punishment
Upon having ascertained that there was a crime and who committed it, a judge must decide 
how the state should respond to the criminal  As noted in the previous section, the sort 
of reconciliation that ubuntu (as understood here) prescribes does not require forgiveness  
Letting go of resentment and related negative attitudes towards an offender could sometimes 
be instrumentally useful for enabling reconciliation, but reconciliation, as the combination of 
the realisation of (behavioural) harmony and the disavowal of prior discord, does not essentially 
consist of that or otherwise require it  
In addition, I now seek to rebut the widespread presumption that reconciliation or 
restorative justice is incompatible with punishment  Justice Sachs’ discussion in Dikoko 
suggests such a view  According to him, ubuntu prescribes restorative justice, where ‘the key 
elements of restorative justice have been identified as encounter, reparation, reintegration and 
participation’32 and where reparation ‘focuses on repairing the harm that has been done rather 
than on doling out punishment’ 33 Although it is doubtful that Sachs would eschew punishment 
altogether in a criminal justice system given what he says about the need for deterrence,34 the 
thrust of his remarks suggest that restoring relationships, including by compensating victims 
for harm they have undergone, is an alternative to punishment  In what follows I argue that 
an ubuntu-based reconciliation often prescribes punishment, indeed as a way to compensate 
victims  
One tempting strategy by which to show that reconciliation can prescribe punishment is to 
note that there are situations in which reconciliation between victims and offenders would be 
possible only after victims were satisfied that offenders had been punished in retributive fashion  
This approach has been suggested by the social scientist Brandon Hamber, informed by his 
engagements with victims of apartheid-era political crimes  He and various co-investigators 
found that ‘there remains a strong feeling amongst victims/survivors that justice should be 
done and that this is necessary if we are to create a new society’ 35 Similarly, Hamber and 
others remark, ‘The door to reconciliation and forgiveness will be opened all that wider if the 
desire for revenge is legitimised and understood, if it is respected and contained, and if it is 
given both public and private space for its expression’ 36 Basically the idea is that only upon 
seeing offenders receive their just deserts would victims be likely to accept their reintegration 
into society 
32 Dikoko (note 2 above) at para 114 
33 Dikoko (note 2 above) at para 114  Elsewhere in this judgment, Justice Sachs remarks: ‘The principal goal 
should be repair rather than punishment  To achieve this objective requires making greater allowance in 
defamation proceedings for acknowledging the constitutional values of ubuntu – botho’  Ibid at para 112 
34 Dikoko (note 2 above) at para 120 
35 B Hamber, T Maepa, T Mofokeng & H van der Merwe ‘Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission: Survivors’ Perceptions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Suggestions for the Final 
Report’ (1998) Recommendation 10, available at http://www csvr org za/publications/1705-submission-to-the-
truth-and-reconciliation-commission-survivors-perceptions-of-the-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-and-
suggestions-for-the-final-report 
36 B Hamber, D Nageng & G O’Malley ‘“Telling It Like It Is    ” Understanding the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission from the Perspective of Survivors’ (2000) 26 Psychology in Society 30–32, 37–38, 39  See also 
B Hamber and R Wilson ‘Symbolic Closure through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in Post-Conflict 
Societies’ (2002) 1 Journal of Human Rights 48 
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However, this is not my preferred approach, since the connection between what is called 
‘reconciliation’ and punishment is not strong enough  By the above rationale, punishment 
would be unjustified if it were unnecessary for victims and offenders to ‘reconcile’ afterwards  
However, many readers will share the intuition that punishment for many kinds of crimes 
would be justified even if victims were to forgive offenders and absolve them of deserved 
punishment  Similar offences should receive comparable penalties, in terms of the degree of 
burden involved  
In contrast, my main strategy is to contend that the preferred understanding of 
‘reconciliation’ routinely includes punishment as partially constitutive of it  Instead of deeming 
punishment to cause reconciliation on occasion, my suggestion is that punishment (nearly) 
always helps to constitute reconciliation  Roughly speaking, the ubuntu-based account of 
reconciliation typically carries a certain kind of punitive justice within it that differs from 
Western retributivism 
There are two reasons for thinking so, grounded on each of the two major facets of 
reconciliation, viz, promotion of behavioural communion in the future and disavowal of its 
having been flouted in the past  First, consider reconciliation insofar as it includes behavioural 
communion in the form of cooperation and aid  That can prescribe compensation; making 
reparations to a victim would be one way for an offender to cooperate with and aid her, and 
often it would be a burden to do so  However, if an offender were wealthy, then making 
reparations would not be burdensome, making this rationale unable to ground punishment to 
the degree that is intuitively warranted  Similarly, if a victim were poor, an offender might be 
able to pay minimal compensation that would aid the victim in a way that would be welcome 
relative to her means, but fail to track the degree of the offence  
Relatedly, behavioural communion in the future could be advanced by preventing recidivism 
on the part of the offender  An offender has a duty to reform himself to avoid committing 
crime again, and the state has an obligation to take steps to prevent a wrongdoer from doing 
wrong again  That is especially true if the wrongdoer is not doing so himself or is unable to 
do so on his own  The Court made this connection between ubuntu and rehabilitation in S v 
Makwanyane: 
[T]he reformative theory … considers punishment to be a means to an end, and not an end in 
itself – that end being the reformation of the criminal as a person, so that the person may, at a 
certain stage, become a normal law-abiding and useful member of the community once again … 
This, in my view, accords fully with the concept of ubuntu 37
However, the same concern about this reasoning arises, namely, that reform and consequent 
cooperation and mutual aid could conceivably occur without hard treatment of the offender 
being involved; consider a spontaneous ‘come to Jesus’ moment on his part  
Therefore, essential to grounding a reconciliation-based justification of punishment 
is its other facet, the disavowal of wrongful discord  It is this under-appreciated, squarely 
expressive dimension of reconciliation that, I argue, reliably brings accountability in the form 
of deprivation in its wake  ‘Actions speak louder than words ’ ‘Put your money where your 
mouth is ’ ‘Talk is cheap ’ In addition to these maxims, a fortune cookie once told me, ‘A 
person of words and not of deeds is like a garden full of weeds ’ I maintain that, in cases of 
serious crime, reconciliation prescribes burdensome compensation and burdensome rehabilitation 
as ways of expressing disapproval on the part of the political community, and also, in the best case, 
37 S v Makwanyane & Another [1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) SA 391 at paras 240–243 (Madala J speaking) 
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remorse on the part of the offender 38 For an offender merely to apologise or for a court merely 
to wag a disapproving finger at him would be inadequate forms of disavowal; in a word, there 
must also be some hardship for the disavowal of a serious crime to be meaningfully expressed, 
whether by the offender or the court 39 
The degree of hardship imposed should track the degree of wrongdoing, in the sense that 
the worse the wrong, the greater the hardship, although retributive proportionality is not 
required  For example, to express disavowal of torture adequately, a court must impose a 
weighty burden indeed on the torturer, but it need not sentence him to be tortured or to a 
fate strictly proportionate to the wrongful harm of that crime  So long as all torturers were 
to receive comparably stiff sentences, even if they were not a matter of torture or its exact 
equivalent, there would be consistency in sentencing 40
Although compensation merely for the sake of moving forward together need not involve 
hard treatment of an offender, compensation in order to disavow a crime plausibly must  If 
an offender were truly sorry and wanted to demonstrate his guilt, he would be willing to place 
hardship on himself as a way to display those emotions, where the greater his wrongdoing 
and the stronger his apt emotional reactions to it, the heavier the hardship  Hence, if the 
offender were rich, he would do more than just cut a cheque to the victim  And if a court 
were truly disapproving of a crime, it would compel the offender to make restitution in a way 
that involved real labour or some other burden  Where making financial compensation would 
mean a change in lifestyle for an offender, it could well be a sentence that adequately disavows 
the offence  
There are, however, ways that compensation could place a weighty burden on an offender 
that are not financial  Perhaps someone who cheats on his taxes should be made to perform 
some dull tasks for the state revenue service  Maybe a person who has robbed a household 
should wear a uniform and serve as a neighbourhood-watch guard for a time  Possibly someone 
who has unjustifiably taken the life of a breadwinner should farm with his hands, providing 
sustenance to the victim’s family  
Of course, victims might not want to be in contact with offenders 41 Ubuntu likely places 
some form of moral obligation upon victims to try to reconcile with offenders -- say, by 
accepting their offers of restitution  It does not follow that a court should force victims to do 
so  In such a case, victims might indicate a preferred way in which offenders should direct 
their efforts  After consultation with a woman who had been physically abused, for instance, a 
38 In the following, I assume that the degree to which an offender should express remorse and the degree to 
which a political community should express disapproval align, although I recognise that this assumption may 
be questioned and might deserve an extended defence elsewhere  
39 Retributive expressivists have adopted this position for some time  See J Hampton ‘The Retributive Idea’ in 
J Hampton & J Murphy Forgiveness and Mercy (1988) 111; and T Metz ‘Realism and the Censure Theory of 
Punishment’ in P Smith & P Comanducci (eds) Legal Philosophy: General Aspects (2002) 117 (Articulates, but 
no longer reflects, a position I once held )
40 There are, therefore, resolutely ‘objective’ dimensions to reconciliatory sentencing: (1) facts about how bad 
a crime was; (2) how severe a penalty is; and (3) which penalties would track a given crime  Ultimately, a 
proponent of reconciliatory sentencing must provide accounts of them, but some headway can be made for 
now without them 
41 Although there are fascinating occasions where offenders and victims have been able to reconcile by labouring 
together  For an example in Canada, see ‘Convicts, Victims Work to Heal Old Wounds on B C  Farm’ available 
at https://www cbc ca/news/canada/convicts-victims-work-to-heal-old-wounds-on-b-c-farm-1 3819003 (2016) 
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court might order her offender to undertake labour for a battered women’s shelter by delivering 
needed items or helping to repair the building  
Beyond disavowing wrongful discord by ordering compensatory labour from offenders, 
a court would also do so by ordering labour from offenders likely to foster moral reform 42 
If offenders are genuinely remorseful, then they of their own accord would not merely take 
steps, but also climb stairs, to show that they would not perform the relevant acts again  In 
addition, courts would express disapproval of the wrongful behaviour by making them do so  
Such penalties would often mean mandatory therapy to get to the root of what caused the 
mistreatment of others, something that would be time-consuming and psychologically difficult  
Consider as well penalties meant to instil empathy and an awareness of the consequences of 
actions, such as a judge sentencing drunk drivers to work in a morgue 43 Finally, there are the 
points that the hardship of punishment can often itself be a way for offenders to appreciate 
how they have mistreated their victims, as well as that the guilt consequent to moral reform 
would also be a foreseeable burden that offenders should undergo  
Even if an offender had a spontaneous appreciation of what he had done wrong and were 
unlikely to commit similar actions again because of that, penalties would usually be apt as ways 
of aiming to cultivate his moral personality while disavowing what he had done  Imagine that 
you were the offender and had had a change of heart right after committing a crime  You would 
want to go out of your way to show that to the victim, her family and others who reasonably 
feel threatened by what you did – they could not just take your word for it  And so you would 
willingly submit to burdens to express remorse, including forms of rehabilitation that would 
provide all the more grounds to think that you will avoid reoffence in the future  If you were 
not willing to do that, it would be right for a court to make you anyway, so as to stand up for 
the victim and to censure your behaviour, all with the aim of improving relationships in the 
future 
This necessity for hardship is one large difference between reconciliatory sentencing and 
more familiar reformative theories of punishment 44 The latter prescribe doing something 
good for the offender, helping him to become a better person, where the hardship of 
punishment is conceived as the key learning tool, so that if learning were to occur without 
the hardship, the logic of these theories entails that the hardship would be unjustified  In 
contrast, by reconciliatory sentencing, the hardship of punishment, which is welcomed as a 
potential learning tool, is inflicted additionally in order to express remorse for and disapproval 
of discord (and thereby express respect for our relational nature)  By this account, expressive 
considerations mean that a court would usually be right to penalise offenders by ordering 
42 For a useful overview of contemporary psychological and criminological research on rehabilitation, see 
B Huebner ‘Rehabilitation’ Oxford Bibliographies Online (2014), available at http://www oxfordbibliographies 
com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0046 xml 
43 ‘Thailand Drunk Drivers Face Morgue Work as Punishment’ BBC News (2016), available at http://www bbc 
com/news/world-asia-36025937 
44 H Morris ‘A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment’ (1981) 18 American Philosophical Quarterly 263; J Hampton 
‘The Moral Education Theory of Punishment’ (1984) 13 Philosophy and Public Affairs 208  See also more 
recent work in therapeutic jurisprudence, such as D Wexler ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2004) 20 Touro Law 
Review 353; and E Erez, M Kilchling & J Wemmers (eds) Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victim Participation 
in Justice: International Perspectives (2011) 
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therapeutic interventions, and offenders should submit to such an order, even if doing so were 
not in fact necessary to prevent recidivism 45 
The expressive dimension of reconciliatory sentencing also enables it to make sense of 
why punishment would be justified in situations where improved relationships are clearly 
not forthcoming  For example, consider the case in which the victim has been killed and 
she had had no family or friends; then, no reconciliation with her or even her intimates 
would be possible, so that it might seem as though reconciliatory punishment would have no 
point  However, part of an attractive reconciliation, I have contended, is disavowing the unjust 
discord that took place, where offenders express remorse for what they have done and the 
political community expresses disapproval of it  Even if a criminal trial sometimes cannot serve 
the function of advancing relationships of participative cooperation and mutual aid, it could 
always disavow respects in which people had been wronged by the opposite, discordant ways 
of relating, again accounting for the intuition that consistency in sentencing must be upheld 
C Some contrasts with Western theories
In order to illustrate and motivate reconciliatory sentencing, I contrast it with the Western, 
individualist accounts discussed above  Although the following points are not ‘knock-down’ 
arguments against the latter, they provide reason to take the former seriously  
First off, it is of course a strike against a theory of punishment if it cannot explain why it 
is only the guilty who should be punished  Utilitarianism notoriously has difficulty restricting 
state punishment to those who have broken just laws, as there can be situations in which 
punishing people known to be innocent would (be expected to) have the best results for 
society  In contrast, a reconciliatory approach forbids punishment of innocent parties, since 
they have not done anything to undermine communal relationship  Those who have not 
been discordant warrant neither burdensome compensation, for there are no victims, nor 
burdensome rehabilitation, for no wrong has been done 
Reconciliatory sentencing avoids another famous problem for utilitarianism, namely, the 
imposition of disproportionately harsh penalties  In principle, severe sentences placed on a 
few for having committed intuitively trivial crimes could be justified if many would benefit in 
the long run from doing so  For example, if people risked receiving 25 years in jail for actions 
such as speeding, failing to indicate when changing lanes, and rolling slowly through stop 
signs, it could be that traffic deaths would be reduced, making the benefits to society worth the 
costs of occasionally ‘making an example’ out of a few offenders  However, most punishment 
theorists believe such penalties would be wrong, regardless of how much good they would do  
Reconciliatory sentencing can account for that intuition, insofar as the degree to which the 
court expresses disapproval, via the imposition of burdens, should be no be greater than the 
45 This account conflicts with the principle that violence, punishment and related kinds of significant discord are 
justified if, and only if, they are both necessary and expected to counteract greater discord on the part of the 
one responsible for it  I have advanced this purely defensive account of force in previous work  T Metz ‘Human 
Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an African Moral Theory’ (2010) 9 Journal of Human Rights 81  In contrast, 
reconciliatory sentencing prescribes penalizing offenders in burdensome compensatory and reformative ways 
to disavow injustice, even if the burdens are unnecessary for compensation or reform  For a powerful reason to 
think that not all permissible uses of force are defensive, consider the case of ‘Morty’ in S Kershnar For Torture: 
A Rights-Based Defense (2011) 53  
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wrongful nature of the crime (including the extent to which the criminal was responsible for 
it), lest the court treat the crime as more wrongful than it was 
A third advantage of reconciliatory sentencing relative to not just utilitarianism, but also 
other prominent forward-looking theories, is that it abjures general deterrence as a mechanism 
by which to control crime  Although some African theorists have appealed to general deterrence 
as a legitimate way to protect communal relationships,46 I maintain that respect for people’s 
capacity to commune probably forbids such an approach  If a thief wrongfully enters my 
house and the only way to get him to leave and without taking my things is to use a certain 
degree of force, I may do so  However, it would intuitively be wrongful (not merely illegal in 
all jurisdictions I am familiar with in North America, Europe and South Africa) to haul him 
out into the street and give him an additional beating intended to scare off other, potential 
thieves  A plausible rationale for why it would be wrong to inflict harm, such as punishment, 
on the guilty for the sake of general deterrence is that one is not liable for the actual or potential 
misdeeds of others  There is no disrespect in using substantial force, such as punishment, if 
necessary to get a wrongdoer to stop his discordant behaviour, to compensate his victims for 
it or to get him to reform so that he will not reoffend  However, there is probably a kind of 
disrespectful treatment when substantial force is used against a wrongdoer for some purpose 
other than getting him to ‘clean up his own mess’ 
Turning now to the Western backward-looking theories, reconciliatory sentencing differs 
from them, and in some prima facie attractive ways  One of the most prominent objections 
to retributive accounts of punishment is that they fail to make sense of why a criminal justice 
system is worth the price 47 It takes a lot of time, effort, money and other resources to arrest 
apparent lawbreakers, to conduct a trial, to punish those who have been found guilty and to 
monitor their progress in a correctional setting, where merely giving people what they deserve 
or correcting unfairness do not seem weighty enough to justify the costs  It seems to many that 
a major public institution should promise to do some kind of good for society, and not merely 
increase the overall amount of suffering or other harm in the world in the manner of an eye for 
an eye  According to a reconciliatory approach, a major point of setting up and maintaining a 
criminal justice system includes reforming offenders so that they do not reoffend, getting them 
to compensate their victims and more generally healing broken relationships  
Another weakness of standard retributive theories is that they cannot easily account for 
intuitions that an offender's moral reform can call for a lesser penalty  For example, it is 
common for judges in South Africa and elsewhere to sentence in part based on whether 
or not an offender has expressed remorse for having committed the crime  That should be 
completely irrelevant on a desert or fairness model, which directs a judge nearly exclusively 
to the nature of the crime committed, regardless of what has happened since  However, by a 
reconciliatory approach, a genuine expression of remorse could be reason to reduce a penalty, 
even if some kind of burden that broadly tracks the nature of the crime is essential, both to 
express remorse and to express disapproval  Similar remarks apply to the practice of parole, 
that is, early release for good behaviour  Concrete evidence of rehabilitation gives a reason to 
reduce a penalty in terms of a reconciliatory approach, if only marginally, but it is no reason 
46 E Aja ‘Crime and Punishment: An Indigenous African Experience’ (1997) 31 Journal of Value Inquiry 353 at 
360 and O Balogun ‘A Philosophical Defence of Punishment in Traditional African Legal Culture’ (2009) 3 
The Journal of Pan African Studies 43 at 52 
47 D Husak ‘Why Punish the Deserving?’ (1992) 26 Nous 447 
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to reduce one according to a retributive approach, supposing the initial penalty was indeed 
strictly proportionate to the crime committed  
A final advantage for reconciliatory sentencing relative to Western retributivism concerns 
penalties that might be deserved or fair, but that are intuitively wrong to impose nonetheless  
I am thinking of torture, rape and death  Torturers, rapists and murderers might well have 
these respective penalties coming to them, as proportionate to what they have done, but they 
would be intuitively unjust for a court to authorise  By an ubuntu-based reconciliation, part 
of the explanation of why these penalties are unjust is that they are not merely unnecessary, 
but also unlikely, to produce meaningful compensation for victims and moral reform on the 
part of offenders  In addition, these kinds of penalties are not necessary in order for offenders 
to express their guilt and for a court to express disapproval of their guilty behaviour, with 
quite weighty but less than strictly proportionate burdens being sufficient  Although these 
considerations probably do not constitute the entire explanation of why certain kinds of severe 
penalties are unjust, they are more than is available to the desert or fairness theorist  
D Some contrasts with current practices
If reconciliation were made the final end of a criminal trial, then some sentencing practices 
common in South Africa and in many other jurisdictions would need to be substantially 
revised  In particular, reconciliation would probably mean that mandatory sentences and 
imprisonment, the focus of Ndlovu v The State, would not be used as frequently as they are  
Brendan Solly Ndlovu was convicted of a particularly brutal rape and sentenced to 
life imprisonment  The Constitutional Court needed to decide whether the sentence was 
appropriate, given that Ndlovu had been charged with rape, not with the infliction of grievous 
bodily harm, but had been sentenced on the basis of both  The mandatory minimum sentence 
for a first offence of rape is 10 years in prison, with a maximum of 15, while the minimum 
(and, equally, maximum) for the infliction of grievous bodily harm is imprisonment for life 
(although parole is possible after having served 25 years)  The Court ruled that the sentence of 
life in prison was unconstitutional, since Ndlovu had been charged only with rape  The Court 
instead imposed the maximum of 15 years, in accordance with the statute governing the crime 
for which Ndlovu had in fact been charged  Although the Court deemed criminal justice on 
the whole to be best served by reducing Ndlovu’s sentence, it lamented its inability to impose 
a much longer sentence of imprisonment on him  
Although this case concerns mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment, these two 
issues are logically distinct; one could have mandatory minimums when it comes to, say fines 
instead of jailtime, and, then, one could imprison without a legislature having indicated which 
amount of time served is essential  I first argue that mandatory minimum sentences, whether 
of prison or some other kind of penalty, are usually unjustified and next that prison is rarely 
an appropriate kind of sentence  
Mandatory minimum sentences are straightforwardly justified by the Western backward-
looking and forward-looking theories  If the sentences are proportionate to the nature of the 
crime, making allowances for mitigating and aggravating factors, then they can be deserved 
for having committed a certain kind of crime or be what would remove an unfair advantage 
obtained by having done so  And if the sentences would incapacitate or deter potential 
offenders to an extent that crime would be reduced to a noticeable degree, then utilitarianism 
and self-defence theory would also prescribe them  
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In contrast, a practice of reconciliatory sentencing demands flexibility in response to the 
particular circumstances of offenders and victims  Above I argued that reconciliatory sentencing 
includes a maximum, permitting disavowal of a strength no greater than the crime, and also 
that it includes a minimum, in the sense of normally requiring some kind of burden to be 
placed on offenders so as to disavow the crime, even on those able to compensate victims and 
change their motivations without a burden  However, in between there would be a range of 
possible severities that a judge would be best placed to pick amongst, a legislature of course 
being uninformed about the specifics of a given case  When determining how victims should 
be compensated, a judge needs to know what particular ways they were harmed, what would 
help make up for those harms, what offenders are realistically capable of doing and what form 
of compensation would place appropriate burdens on offenders  Similarly, when determining 
how offenders should be reformed, a judge needs to know why they were motivated to offend, 
what would be likely to change their motivations and what would be appropriately burdensome 
with regard to expressive considerations  Reconciliatory sentencing requires judgement  
Somewhat similar considerations apply to imprisonment, by which I mean the predominant 
form where offenders are simply locked up, at best given time to think and offered some 
optional rehabilitative and recreational activities  Backward-looking approaches to punishment 
easily justify prison, since they do not require any good to come from a type of penalty  If 
prison is of a severity proportionate to the nature of the crime, where the severity is deserved or 
would correct unfairness, it is justified  And then the forward-looking theories naturally justify 
prison as well  Recall that, for them, incapacitation and deterrence are proper mechanisms by 
which punishment should be used to reduce crime, where prison renders someone unable to 
commit crime and tends to make prospective criminals fearful of getting caught  
Prison should not be the default mode of punishment, however, if the aim of criminal 
justice is reconciliation, understood as the combination of the disavowal of the wrongful 
discord done in the past and the improved chance of harmonious relationship in the future  
Although prison can express disavowal of a crime, it does not serve the additional function of 
making repair of the broken relationship more likely  Merely locking someone up does not 
reliably foster either compensation to victims or reform of offenders  
What, then, should have been done with Ndlovu? His case is amongst the most difficult for 
a reconciliatory approach, given how heinous his behaviour was  Detainment would have been 
appropriate, but that is not necessarily the same thing as jail as we know it  Ndlovu should have 
been made to undertake truly burdensome reparations for his victim and to undergo difficult 
procedures likely to change his inclination to reoffend, both of which could have been ways 
of expressing remorse on his part, but at least would have been vehicles by which to express 
disapproval on the part of the political community  
For a start, Ndlovu of course should have apologised to his victim, a way of showing that 
she matters  In addition, he should have been given a way to earn money that could have been 
directed to her, or otherwise afforded a way to labour in ways that would have benefited her  
Perhaps because of the crime she has been unable to work, and so has found it difficult to afford 
school fees for her children; Ndlovu could have been required to pay for them  If she did not 
want to be reminded of him, the court could have ordered him to help a charity of her choice 
or a state clinic that would offer her therapy 
Furthermore, Ndlovu should have been mandated to undergo counselling of an intense sort  
With respect to his beliefs, he should have been forced to reconsider his views of the standing 
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of women  Perhaps he considers them to be his property or second-class citizens, and hence 
as something to be used as a mere means to his ends  His emotions, too, should have been 
explored and probably adjusted  Did he commit the brutal rape because he feels impotent and 
needed a sense of power? Does he hate women because of how he was reared? One hopes that, 
in time, his personhood would develop, so that he would feel the appropriate sort of guilt and 
be haunted by what he has done  And then Ndlovu also should have done what would have 
changed his desires  Perhaps he lacks a second-order desire to avoid desiring to rape and to 
inflict pain, or, if he has such a second-order desire, it might be ineffective at changing his 
first-order ones  Court-ordered self-exploration would have been apt, as would have been the 
mentoring of others less reformed, supposing there were improvement on Ndlovu’s part  
E Replies to objections
Some readers will find these penalties to be intuitively insufficient, with the prospect of 
compensation, reform and improved relationships not being important enough to forgo a 
harsher penalty such as imprisonment or even corporal punishment of some kind  However, 
if ubuntu is our touchstone, then we have to let go of vengeful or retributive reactions 48 
Conversely, others will find the therapeutic interventions overly intrusive or otherwise 
illiberal in some way  However, the claim is not that either brainwashing or brain surgery is 
permissible; the methods of reform must be consistent with respect for a person’s capacity for 
communal relationship  Plus, a focus on the offender’s character is arguably justified, given an 
ubuntu ethic’s concern for personhood and supposing the development of personhood would 
be a particularly reliable way to prevent recidivism  
However, what is to be done if an offender refuses to undertake the burdens of compensation 
and reform? In that case, it might be that threats and penalties designed to prompt conformity 
would be appropriate, where these might involve imprisonment  Such a ‘back-up’ approach 
is reminiscent of that taken by South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where 
a normal trial could proceed if offenders did not fully disclose the political crimes they had 
committed during the apartheid era  Although not all penalties would be reconciliatory in such 
a scheme, it would still constitute a radical departure from the current approaches in most 
jurisdictions in Africa and the West 
For another objection, what if an offender is simply too dangerous to participate 
in compensatory or reformative procedures? In that case, confinement, in contrast to 
imprisonment, would be appropriate  Putting in prison, I am supposing, would involve, if 
not the aim to harm, at least an intervention that is likely to harm the one imprisoned  In 
contrast, confinement need not involve such an intention or expectation  It could be a matter 
of sequestering an out of control offender in a comfortable manner, similar to a quarantine  
In that case, it would not count as punishment, since no hard treatment would essentially be 
involved and since it would not be a response to a crime that had already occurred  Preventive 
detention of this sort would be outside the reconciliatory approach to punishment that I have 
advanced here, even if it does have a small but proper role to play in a criminal justice system 
48 Interestingly, one interlocutor has suggested to me that reconciliatory sentencing, given its expressive focus, 
might be apt for the very worst deeds, such as crimes against humanity, but not for crimes such as theft in 
which symbolic considerations seem irrelevant  However, reconciliatory sentencing is apt as a way to respond 
to any crime in which people’s capacity to relate communally is treated disrespectfully  The disrespect in theft 
also calls for an expressive response in part 
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Finally, one might reasonably be concerned about how realistic reconciliatory sentencing is, 
at least in jurisdictions in which there are many crimes but few defence attorneys, prosecutors 
and judges with expertise  Treating reconciliation as the end of a criminal trial would mean 
spending vast amounts of resources to establish guilt during the trial, to ascertain an apt 
sentence if guilt is established and then to carry out the sentence  In contrast, a system of plea 
bargaining, as standardly combined with fines or imprisonment, would be much more efficient, 
and could well be essential for any criminal justice system with substantial numbers of cases  
I accept the point about needing to make compromises in situations of scarce human 
and other resources  However, doing so is consistent with maintaining that reconciliatory 
sentencing is an ideal for which to strive  Reconciliatory sentencing plausibly explains not 
only why plea bargaining would be an unjust way of dealing with crimes in situations where 
there is no resource scarcity, but also how plea bargaining sacrifices moral weight even when 
it is, all things considered, justified  Plea bargaining streamlines criminal justice at the cost 
of failure to ascertain guilt with care, to hear victims out and to sentence in ways likely to 
compensate victims, reform offenders and adequately disavow previous wrongdoing  By my 
favoured account of sentencing, we should want as much of those things as we can realistically 
get in the present circumstances, striving for progressive realisation of more over time  
V CONCLUSION
My aim in this article has been to sketch some respects in which a judge should sentence in a 
criminal trial, assuming its central aim to foster an ubuntu-based conception of reconciliation  
Specifically, I have advanced the view that, instead of requiring forgiveness or otherwise 
forbidding punishment, an attractive notion of reconciliation includes the disavowal of crime, 
which, in turn, typically prescribes punishment  A genuine expression of remorse on the part 
of offenders or disapproval on the part of the political community means placing burdens on 
them, in particular ones oriented towards the rehabilitation of offenders and the compensation 
of victims  Although this account of just punishment has grown out of characteristically African 
views of personhood, communion and reconciliation, it is meant to capture some intuitions 
that are widely shared, even by those who currently endorse more Western theories 
Supposing that reconciliatory sentencing indeed merits consideration, a number of other 
theoretical projects would naturally follow  For one, it is worth considering whether the 
evidentiary procedures of a criminal trial need to be revised so as to foster reconciliation  I 
have contended that they need to reveal guilt and the degree of it, but might there be a way 
of doing so that would be more likely, say, to prompt an apology on the part of offenders?49 
What does reconciliation entail for the adversarial versus inquisitorial distinction about how 
to ascertain legal guilt? 
For another, in this article I have set aside the question of precisely whom a crime 
characteristically wrongs, having focused on an individual victim, but not also her (extended) 
family or the broader society  However, it is well known that indigenous sub-Saharan 
peoples often considered legal transgressions to have a community dimension, or at least for 
many others beyond the ‘immediate’ or ‘direct’ perpetrator and victim to have a stake in 
49 Cf Sachs J (note 2 above) para 117 
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reconciliatory processes 50 How might a judge overseeing a criminal trial in a ‘modern’ state 
plausibly incorporate these facets of African criminal justice? 
Beyond the responsibilities of a judge in a criminal trial, it is also worth thinking about 
how reconciliation might bear on those of other actors  For example, I have not systematically 
addressed the matter of what should be criminalised  However, viewing reconciliation to be 
the final end of a criminal trial probably has implications for what a legislature should count 
as a crime  Might it rule out, for instance, victimless activities as meriting a response from a 
criminal justice system? Should legislators decriminalise activities such as physician-assisted 
suicide and drug-taking, where these are not inherently discordant in respect of other parties, 
or should they instead criminalise such behaviour out of concern for citizens’ personhood? 
Finally, for now, the account of sentencing given here, which includes compensation to 
victims as an inherent feature, raises the question of whether the distinction between criminal 
and civil trials should be abandoned  Normally, the sort of harm that a civil trial seeks to repair 
is what was caused wrongfully, suggesting that the kind of criminal trial advocated in this article 
would render a civil trial unnecessary  However, this inference might be too quick  Suppose, for 
example, that a way of compensating that would be appropriately burdensome on the offender 
would not provide as much repair of the harm done to the victim as some other way  Would 
a civil trial be apt in that situation? Or are there harms that were not wrongfully caused by 
a certain agent but which this agent should be forced to compensate, say, because he is best 
placed to do so? I submit that these and related questions merit consideration  
50 J Alie ‘Reconciliation and Traditional Justice: Tradition-based Practices in the Kpaa Mende of the Sierra 
Leone’ in L Huyse & M Salter (eds) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from 
African Experiences (2008) 136–137; E Masitera ‘Ubuntu Justice and the Power to Transform the Modern 
Zimbabwean Rehabilitation Justice System’ in E Masitera & F Sibanda (eds) Power in Contemporary Zimbabwe 
(2018), 114–116 
